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on the one hand on concepts and experimental systems that were too vague in order to stimulate further
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contrast, Sewall Wright, apart from being one of the architects of the neo-Darwinian synthesis of the 1930s,
opened up new paths of testable quantitative developmental genetic investigations. He placed his research
within a framework of logical reasoning, which resulted in the farsighted speculation that examinations of
biological systems should be related to the regulation of hierarchical genetic subsystems, possibly providing a
mechanism for development and evolution. I argue that his suggestion of basing the study of systems on clearly
deﬁned properties of the components has proved superior to Goldschmidt's approach of studying systems as a
whole, and that attempts to integrate different ﬁelds at a too early stage may prove futile or worse.l rights reserved.© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Beginning in the late 19th century, after the establishment of the
unifying concept of the cell, modern experimental biology owed its
early successes mainly to analytical approaches that fragmented
biology intomany different sub-disciplines. Experimental embryology
(Entwicklungsmechanik) was founded by Wilhelm Roux as a direct
response to the merely descriptive evolutionary morphology of Ernst
Haeckel, in which development and evolution were considered as a
unity. By methodically (not conceptually, see Griesemer, 2007)
separating questions of the transmission of traits from those of
development and evolution, Mendel laid the basis for modern
genetics. (In contrast, Darwin's attempt at about the same time of a
great synthesis of development, genetics, and evolution quickly
turned out to be a dead end (Deichmann, 2010)). Some decades
later, biology was to owe its progress also to successful syntheses
between formerly disconnected ﬁelds: (1) The chromosome theory of
heredity integrated cytology and genetics, ﬁrst vaguely proposed by
Theodor Boveri and, independently, Walter Sutton, in 1903, then
developed in an extremely successful way by Thomas H. Morgan andhis school from 1910; and (2) The “Modern Synthesis” that integrated
Mendelian genetics, population genetics and Darwinian evolution.
Major protagonists in the 1930s and 1940s were Ronald A. Fisher, J.B.S.
Haldane, and Sewall Wright.
I here review three other early attempts at unifying separate areas of
biology, in particular development, genetics, physiology, and evolution:
Jacques Loeb's reductionist project for unifying through physico-
chemical explanations in the late 19th and early 20th century; Richard
Goldschmidt's anti-reductionist attempts to unify by integration in the
ﬁrst half of the 20th century; and Sewall Wright's combination of
reductionist research and vision of hierarchical genetic systems, also in the
ﬁrst half of the 20th century. I compare the fruitfulness of these projects
and analyze towhat extent their successes and failures can be related to
the approaches applied.Jacques Loeb's reductionist project of unifying by
physico-chemical explanations
Jacques Loeb, born in Mayen near Cologne in 1859, was a
physiologist, later experimental biologist. He immigrated to the United
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position, since hewas Jewish and outspokenly liberal. Holding positions
at, successively, Bryn Mawr College, University of California, Berkeley,
and, from 1910 until his death in 1924, at the Rockefeller Institute for
Medical Research, he was increasingly regarded as “America's emblem
of pure wissenschaft” (Kay, 1993), as someone who by the turn of the
century “had come to symbolize the appeal and temptation of open-
ended experimentation among biologists in America” (Pauly, 1987).
Loeb's strong conviction that the basic life phenomena can be
explained in principle by physical and chemical laws, was accompanied
by a preoccupation with ﬁnding physical and chemical explanations for
basic life phenomena. This also made him a pioneer in studies relating
genetics, biochemistry, in particular enzymology, and development
(a detailed overview on this convergence is in Ravin (1977), see S.I. note
1). After Eduard Buchner in 1897 separated enzymes responsible for
alcoholic fermentation from yeast cells and thereby showed that
enzymatic action was not dependent on living cells, enzymes became
a major focus of biochemical research. Biochemists expected that the
basic functions of the cell and life might ﬁnd their explanation in the
properties of these enzymes. Loeb (1912) envisaged that “the speciﬁc
character of each cell may possibly one day be characterized by the
speciﬁc ferments it contains and produces”.
In a series of papers between 1907 and 1915 Loeb, through
experiment, developed the idea that genes were the determiners for
enzymes in development (Loeb and Chamberlain, 1915). Though
highly appreciative of the work of Mendel and Morgan and of the
fertility of the concept of genes as abstract units, he was one of the few
biologists to consider worthwhile to also examine the material basis
of genes and gene action, demanding that geneticists should
determine “the chemical substances in the chromosomes […] and
the mechanism by which these substances give rise to the hereditary
character” (Loeb, 1912). He rejected the notion held, e.g. by Richard
Goldschmidt, that genes were in fact enzymes, based on quantitative
grounds: “The hereditary factor in this case must consist of material
which determines the formation of a given mass of these enzymes,
since the factors in the chromosomes are too small to carry the whole
mass of the enzymes existing in the embryo or adult.” (Ibid.) This
reasoning was appreciated by Thomas H. Morgan, who was in general
disinclined to speculate on the chemical nature of the gene and its
action and in particular rejected assertions of genes being enzymes,
because they disregarded the crucially important distinction of
genotype and phenotype, proposed by Wilhelm Johannsen (1909).
Morgan considered Loeb's and Chamberlain's standpoint concerning
genes and enzymes “the most correct one” (Morgan, 1919).
Loeb introduced the concept of “autocatalysis” as basis for “the
mechanism for the continuity of the hereditary substances”, which, he
thought, was identical with the “secret of life” (Loeb, 1909a). The
concept of autocatalysis was taken up by several authors e.g. Hermann
Muller (1922), who later analyzed this concept's role in stimulating
research into material properties of the gene, but also drew attention
to its conceptual shortcomings (Muller, 1967). An example of a ﬂawed
usage of this concept is phage research. In analogy to the autocatalytic
activation of some enzymes such as trypsin, some biochemists applied
this concept also to phage replication. But Max Delbrück and Emory
Ellis showed in 1939 that phage replication did not show any signs of
sigmoid curves, thus could not be autocatalytic (Morange, 1998), a
conclusion that was the basis for genetic phage research. Loeb based
his assumption of self-replication of the hereditary material on
Theodor Boveri's discovery that the nucleus was the carrier of the
hereditary properties, Boveri's demonstration that the nuclei of all
cells of an embryo have the same size, and Hans Driesch's and Julius
Sachs's analyses of the relation between the sizes of protoplasm and
nuclei during development.
After Miescher's discovery of DNA as a new macromolecule in the
nucleus (1871) and some biologists' assumptions of DNA being
chromatin, Loeb anticipated with a clarity that was exceptional at histime, the crucial role of DNA for life and reproduction, its species
speciﬁcity, and its capacity to replicate identically (for example Loeb,
1909a). In Loeb's opinion, the solution to the question of what life is,
and how it can be made from non-living material, had to come from
the chemistry of proteins and DNA.
Loeb's attempts to relate central features of life, such as heredity, to
the chemistry of macromolecules strongly contrasted with the
morphological approach employed by the vast majority of cell
biologists. Moreover, the notion that DNA might be able to account
for biological speciﬁcity (in today's terms: to carry biological
information) was rejected by a growing number of chemists and
biochemists who assumed that DNA consisted of small uniform
tetranucleotide molecules; only in 1950 was the species speciﬁcity of
DNA demonstrated (by Erwin Chargaff, see e.g. Deichmann, 2004). A
remarkable exception of a chemist who as early as 1914 envisaged
genetic engineering with synthetic DNA was Nobel laureate Emil
Fischer, while working on the purine bases of DNA (see S.I. note 2).
However, neither Fischer nor anybody else pursued this idea seriously
or devised experiments to this end. The interest of scientists in the
material basis of inheritance and in the biological functions of DNA,
which emerged in the late 19th century, to a large extent disappeared
during the ﬁrst decades of the 20th century, when genetics was
established as a scientiﬁc discipline (Deichmann, 2004). When, in the
1930s, a new interest in the chemical basis of heredity emerged, it was
related to proteins, which were considered as sole carriers of
biological speciﬁcity, a notion called “protein paradigm” (Kay, 1993)
or “protein dogma” of the gene (Olby, 1994).
Loeb's passionate promotion of biology as an experimental mech-
anistic science made him dissatisﬁed with the merely descriptive and
speculative approaches of evolutionary biology: “In science we [can]
only take things for proven when they are based on quantitative
experiments and from this point of view ours [is] not the era of Darwin
but the era of Pasteur” (Loeb to E. G. Conklin, 9 January 1924, Library of
Congress, Manuscript Dept, Loeb Papers, ﬁle Conklin) was his response
to a group of Darwin scholars whose arguments he considered
unscientiﬁc. Loeb criticized evolutionary biology for the incompleteness
of the theory of natural selection, i.e. the lack of mechanistic
explanations for variation and species transformation, and the lack of
experimental evidence for this transformation. According to Loeb, “any
theory of life phenomena must be based on our knowledge of the
physicochemical constitution of living matter, and neither Darwin nor
Lamarck was concerned with this. Moreover, we cannot consider any
theory of evolution as proved unless it permits us to transform at desire
one species into another, and this has not yet been accomplished.”
(Loeb, 1916).
Loeb rejected themethodological division of the phenomena of life
into ‘biological’ (‘ontological’) strands, e.g. behavior, development,
and evolution, and ‘physiological’, as was prevalent at his time, as
counterproductive; his models for biology were Liebig, Pasteur, and
Emil Fischer (Pauly, 1987). A similar division was reintroduced some
decades later by Ernst Mayr (1962) and Theodosius Dobzhansky
(1964, 1969), who distinguished between proximate and ultimate
causes, and Cartesian (mechanistic) and Darwinian (historical)
aspects of biology respectively. This division became methodically
increasingly irrelevant as mechanistic and molecular approaches also
became widespread in evolutionary biology.
For Loeb one possibility to give the study of evolution an
experimental basis had to come from genetics. He called on geneticists
to experimentally generate mutations (1912): “The discovery of de
Vries that new species may arise by mutation and the wide if not
universal applicability of Mendel's law to phenomena of heredity, as
shown especially by Bateson and his pupils, must, for the time being, if
not permanently, serve as a basis for theories of evolution. These
discoveries place before the experimental biologist the deﬁnite task of
producing mutations by physico-chemical means.” Some years later,
in 1927, Hermann Muller indeed successfully carried out artiﬁcial
Fig. 1. Intersexual males from L. dispar, (Goldschmidt, 1927), upper left: almost female,
lower right: male.
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controlled way.
Another aspect of evolutionary theory which Loeb wanted to bring
under experimental control was the question of the origin of life,
which he related to that of synthesizing artiﬁcial life. For Loeb the
generally accepted view that spontaneous generation of life, even of
simple bacterial cells, does not occur in nature (Pasteur, 1861), did not
contradict the assumption that under special conditions this had been
possible in nature, and could be achieved in the laboratory (for details
of Loeb's views, see Deichmann, 2010). Based on his conviction that
life was characterized by a capacity to synthesize “complicated
speciﬁc material from indifferent or non-speciﬁc simple compounds
of the surrounding medium”, Loeb was critical of inanimate models
for life processes. He disagreed for example with equating life with
crystals, the growth of which was simply adding the same molecules
as found in its supersaturated solution (Loeb, 1916). He also rejected
the claims of some physical scientists of having artiﬁcially produced
new life through osmotic growths resembling fungi and lower plants
and animals, such as sea urchins. According to him these growth
processes and formswere not “an imitation of the living since they are
lacking the characteristic synthetic chemical processes” (Loeb, 1916).
He held that whoever claimed to have succeeded in making living
matter from the inanimate would have to prove that he succeeded in
producing nuclear material able to reproduce identically (Loeb,
1909b, cited in Loeb, 1912). Thus for Loeb, the characteristics of life
were inseparably connected to properties of macromolecules, i.e.
proteins and DNA.
To conclude, Loeb's mechanistic and reductionist biological
research program strongly and directly inﬂuenced the work of leading
ﬁgures in experimental biology during the early 20th century, such as
biochemist Otto Warburg, geneticists Thomas Hunt Morgan and
Hermann Muller, and behavioral scientist Herbert S. Jennings. The
molecular biological approach, which resulted from this program,
proved highly successful. It was necessary for explaining evolutionary
change, but, taken alone, thus far was insufﬁcient to explain
mechanisms for major such changes. It was the rapidly progressing
systems approaches based on hierarchical gene networks that seemed
to bring about a revolution in regard to the scope of explanation (see
e.g. Erwin and Davidson, 2009; Laubichler, 2009). Loeb's demands
that evolutionary theories be given an experimental basis and that
species generation and transformation be shown in the laboratory
have been transformed into actuality in recent decades, e.g. in
synthetic experimental evolution (ibid.).
Richard Goldschmidt's anti-reductionist attempts to unify
by integration
The zoologist Richard Goldschmidt, born 1878 in Frankfurt, started
his career in Germany twenty years after Loeb, at a time when genetic
research was already established in various centers. Studying and
working with the most renowned German zoologists at the time, in
particular Richard Hertwig, he began his scientiﬁc work with the
morphology and histology of nematodes (1900–1909). This was
followed by works on sex determination and genetics (1909–1934)
and organic evolution (from 1930). In 1914 he became head of the
department for animal genetics at the newly founded Kaiser Wilhelm
Institute (KWI) for Biology in Berlin, of which he became Second
Director in 1919. Since he was Jewish, Goldschmidt was expelled from
his position in 1935; he emigrated to the United States, where he
became a professor at the University of California, Berkeley. Unlike
Loeb and Sewall Wright, he has received wide attention from
historians and historically oriented scientists (see below).
Goldschmidt became best known for his work, starting in 1909, on
sex determination and genetics of different geographical races of
Lymantria dispar, the gypsy moth, of which he bred hundreds of
thousands of individuals. Observing ambiguous sexual forms duringdifferent times of development, he coined, in 1915, the term
intersexuality for the switch-over at a certain time during the
development from one sex to the other in regard to secondary sexual
properties (turning point theory) (Fig. 1). According to this theory, the
time until the turning point was genetically determined and a
measure of the degree of intersexuality (a quantitative correlation
which he called time law). Goldschmidt claimed to have received the
highest percentages of intersexes when he crossed Japanese and
German races. He explained this phenomenon with large quantitative
differences in the sex determining genes between these races and
formulated mathematical equations, from which the turning point
during the development of intersexes could, allegedly, be determined
(Fig. 2).
Goldschmidt interpreted the existence of a time law and the
quantitative characteristics of the controlling gene balance by an
enzymatic action of genes in development. Based on this view, he
proposed the theory of genic action by intertwined and balanced
velocities of the reactions of sex determining processes, controlled by
the quantities of the genes (enzymes), which he called the Physiological
Theory of Heredity (Goldschmidt, 1927, 1934). This theory implied a
disintegration of the chromosome during the interphase, asserted that
mutationswere quantitative (not qualitative) changes in the amount of
a gene (enzyme), and claimed that alleles of genes differed in quantity
not in quality. Different quantities of genes catalyzed, in development,
different reaction rates.
The Physiological Theory rejected central elements of the chromo-
some theory of heredity, in particular what Goldschmidt called the
factorial “hypothesis”, and the notion of crossover and its implications
for genemapping. He tried to explain the regularities of crossover by a
colloidal gene-concept, claiming that the task of chromatin was
adsorption of hereditary enzymes and that the variables and
constants of crossover reﬂected the variables and constants of the
laws of adsorption (Goldschmidt, 1917; see comment of Sturtevant,
1917).
Goldschmidt's gene concept changed again in the 1930s, when it
became closely linked to his concept of evolution, which likewise
underwent dramatic changes. An early advocate of neo-Darwinism, he
became a ﬁerce critic later on, regarding neo-Darwinian mechanisms,
that is, the accumulation of small mutations, as irrelevant for
evolutionary changes. Following Hugo de Vries and William Bateson
who advocated a saltationist interpretation of evolution, in thewords of
de Vries (in 1906): “The theory of mutation assumes that new species
and varieties are produced from existing forms by certain leaps” (Mayr,
1997), Goldschmidt postulated “bridgeless gaps” between species and
Fig. 2. Types of intersexuality as a representation of the difference between female and
male valences F minus M (Goldschmidt, 1920).
6 U. Deichmann / Developmental Biology 357 (2011) 3–12proposed that they can only be accounted for by large sudden
evolutionary jumps (saltations). For these he proposed two genetic
mechanisms: Developmentalmacromutationswhichwere supposed to
lead to “hopefulmonsters”; and “systemicmutations”, a re-patterningof
chromosomes, i.e. a re-organization of the chemical system of the
chromosomes (Goldschmidt, 1940, see also Dietrich, 2000, 2003).
In his concept of “systemicmutations”Goldschmidt nowquestioned
the classical gene concept altogether and replaced his former genetic
theories with a model in which the concept of particulate genes was
abandoned. Chromosomes were supposed to act as a whole, and all
mutations were chromosomal rearrangements (Goldschmidt, 1940,
1951). He related his holistic genetic speculations to what he called the
reaction system of an organism: “The idea of the reaction system […] is
opposed to the idea of integrated genic action. It means that the germ
plasm as a whole; i.e., predominantly the chromosome complex,
controls the general feature of development which leads to a deﬁnite
type, the species in question. This idea dispenses completely with the
individual gene and its individual action, […].” As a result, “the germ
plasmas awhole controls a deﬁnite reaction system,which, then is not a
mosaic of separate effects but a single developmental system controlled
as a whole by one agency” (Goldschmidt, 1940). Genes and gene
mutations were not needed “at all” to understand evolution, they were
replaced by the “serial pattern of the chromosome and its parts” (ibid).
He held that “an unlimited number of patterns is available without a
single qualitative chemical change in the chromosomal material and
that the systemic pattern mutation – as opposed to a gene mutation –
appears to be the major genetic process leading to macroevolution, i.e.
evolution beyond the blind alleys of microevolution” (ibid). Conse-
quently he dismissedBridges' seminal idea that newgeneswere formed
byduplication and subsequentmutationsas “not [to] be taken seriously”
and considered the fact that inversions and other chromosomal re-
arrangements occurred without noticeable effects – a clear contradic-
tion to his theory – “as an accident, without any signiﬁcance” (ibid).
From the 1940s Goldschmidt studied homoeotic mutations in
Drosophila in order to support his view of large evolutionary jumps.
Homoeotic (later homeotic) mutations cause an organ to differentiate
abnormally and usually have large phenotypical effects such as legs
growing in place of antennae or an extra set of wings; they were ﬁrst
described by William Bateson in plants (in 1894). Goldschmidt used
mutations, in which wings were transformed into leg-like structures
(podoptera mutations see below). He argued that if it is possible to
“mutate [complex organs like wings] in one step into another more
primitive organ [like a leg]”, then it is very likely “that the opposite also
happens, namelymutationof leg intowing” and it has to beaccepted as a
fact that “insect wings originated as a ‘saltation’ and not through slow
evolution” (Goldschmidt, 1945, cited in Lipshitz, 1996). Thequestionable
logic of this reasoningwas criticized byHoward Lipshitz (Lipshitz, 1996).
Goldschmidt had a broad knowledge of genetics but he used, disregard-
ing logical contradictions, his knowledge of novel developments mainly
to provide evidence for his own claims. By interpreting homoeotic
mutants in a purely speculative way in terms of the (ﬁctitious)rearrangement of chromosomal sections, he did not contribute to an
understanding of these mutations.
Goldschmidt's “synthesis” — historical assessments
Goldschmidt was a controversial scientist. Because of this and
because his work is still credited with having pioneered a new
evolutionary synthesis, I insert here a section on the reception of this
work and a reﬂection on successful syntheses and dead ends.
Appreciation
Goldschmidt has been appreciated by historians as well as
biologists as the ﬁrst scientist to integrate heredity, development,
evolution and biochemistry. According to his student Curt Stern,
Goldschmidt, by emphasizing the role of genes in physiology and
development, developed a new theme for future research (Stern,
1967), a remarkable assessment given the fact that Stern not only
neverworked along Goldschmidt's lines but even (in 1931) published,
in opposition to Goldschmidt's Physiological Theory, deﬁnitive cyto-
logical conﬁrmation for crossing over. Geneticist Ernst Caspari
emphasized Goldschmidt's motivational inﬂuence: Goldschmidt's
“quantitative theory of genetics” was attractive to students “because
it united concepts from genetics, embryology and biochemistry and in
this way offered amore comprehensive view of life processes than the
competing theory based on interactions at the gene level only”
(Caspari, 1980). According to developmental biologist Klaus Sander,
Goldschmidt was one of the few biologists to spend time and thought
on the role of genes in development, anticipating that “gene
activation” would assist in generating a stratiﬁed pattern of organ-
forming substances in the insect oocyte (Sander, 1986). According to
the evolutionary developmental biologists Scott F. Gilbert, John M.
Opitz and Rudolf A. Raff, Goldschmidt's (and C.H. Waddington's)
research was the key for understanding the relationship between
genetics, development and evolution (Gilbert et al., 1996). Stephen J.
Gould, who through his and Eldredge's model of punctuated
equilibria, that is discontinuous tempos of change in the process of
speciation, became a dissenter from neo-Darwinian gradualism,
praised Goldschmidt for his stand against neo-Darwinism (but was
vehemently opposed to his concept of systemic mutations): “As a
Darwinian, I wish to defend Goldschmidt's postulate that macroevo-
lution is not simply microevolution extrapolated, and that major
structural transitions can occur rapidly without a smooth series of
intermediate stages” (Gould and Eldredge, 1977).
Historian Michael Dietrich, who for decades has analyzed
Goldschmidt's work, strongly promotes the view that Goldschmidt
pioneered the integration of development, evolution, and genetics
(e.g. Dietrich, 2000), a view that was expounded in wikipedia (July
2010). In a more recent publication, he holds, more cautiously, that
Goldschmidt's dissent from orthodox views in genetics and
evolution, even though it met with strong criticism, created an
opportunity for innovation, the proposal of alternatives to the
accepted foundations of genetics and neo-Darwinian evolution
(Dietrich, 2008). Similarly, following Gilbert et al.'s assessment,
historian Marsha Richmond holds that “Goldschmidt's program of
physiological genetics stimulated a number of developmentally
minded geneticists and developmental biologists in the 1930s and
1940s”, in particular physiological geneticists in Britain, such as
Conrad Waddington and Joseph Needham, and his “approach to
problems of heredity, development, and evolution […] continues to
resonate today” (Richmond, 2007).
There is, however, no evidence that the scientists who initiated
developmental genetics in the 1980s did so with reference to
Goldschmidt. Edward B. Lewis, one of the founders of this ﬁeld,
never cited Goldschmidt, not even in his historical treatise (Lewis,
1994). Ernst Caspari, an early pioneer of the ﬁeld, was the ﬁrst to
examine the mechanism of genic action by the method of tissue
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of a speciﬁc substance (which for a while was called gene-hormone),
(Caspari, 1933; Kühn et al., 1935). Even Caspari, in his treatise on the
history of research in genic control of development (Caspari, 1960),
did not mention Goldschmidt as one of the pioneers of this ﬁeld
despite his high praise for Goldschmidt in his biographical essay
(Caspari, 1980).
Criticism
Goldschmidt was criticized because of methodological ﬂaws in his
work, in particular the (hidden) speculative nature of his theories
and vagueness of core concepts, and the lack of reliability of his
experiments.
The speculative nature of theories and vagueness of core concepts.
Goldschmidt himself emphasized – in words – the importance of
empirical research. He explicitly rejected as pure hypotheses and
speculations central contents of the chromosome theory of inheritance
as suggested by Morgan and his school: “A theory of inheritance has to
be grounded above all in facts, the facts of experimental genetics and
developmental biology” (Goldschmidt, 1927, author's translation). He
recommended to his critics the view of Darwin whom he quotes as
follows: “I have steadily endeavoured to keepmymind free so as to give
up any hypothesis, however much beloved (and I cannot resist forming
one on any subject) as soon as facts are shown to be opposed to it.”
(Goldschmidt, 1951).
That his actual research practices were, however, quite different,
was perceived and criticized early on. In Germany, the speculative
nature of his genetic theories was received with a mixture of
appreciation and criticism. An example is renowned zoologist Alfred
Kühn who appreciated Goldschmidt's “courageous attempt to form a
broad embryological synthesis between gene and phenotypical
properties”, which he placed in the tradition of great German
speculative biological theories (“very impressive in its intellectual
consistency, altogether not compelling”). “However”, Kühn warned,
“it would be dangerous, if [Goldschmidt's] construction of genius
were regarded as already reliable knowledge and were dogmatized”
(Kühn, 1928, author's translation). In contrast to the United States,
comprehensive speculative biological theories were still generally
accepted in Germany in the ﬁrst half of the 20th century. Further
examples are Hans Driesch's Analytical Theory of Organic Development
(1894) and Fritz von Wettstein's Plasmon Theory (v. Wettstein, 1927,
1930).
In theUnited States Goldschmidt'sworkwas severely criticized early
on. The criticism focused on methodical ﬂaws and the hidden
speculative nature of his supposedly empirical work. Alfred Sturtevant
from the Morgan school made it clear that the allegedly quantitative
basis of Goldschmidt's concept of intersexuality lacked any empirical
evidence: “The interpretation is in appearance a quantitative one, and is
often so described, but there are no quantitative data. The numerical
values [of the strengths of the male and female tendencies] are
arbitrarily assigned hypothetical ones; a value of 80 assigned to a single
M does not refer to any measured or deﬁned units. The papers contain
numerous curves, representing speciﬁc hypotheses about the course of
development, but these are also arbitrary and not based on any
measurements. The papers contain accounts of a large number of
crosses, descriptions, and photographs of many intersexes. One cannot
fail to be impressed by the extent of the work — but I confess that I
should be more impressed if there had been use of more powerful
genetic and cytological techniques, and more attempt to get objective
quantitative data.” (Sturtevant, 1965).
Similarly, but without mentioning Goldschmidt's name, Hermann
Muller, likewise a student of Morgan's, held that, “The real trouble
comes when speculation masquerades as empirical fact. For those who
cry out most loudly against ‘theories’ and ‘hypotheses’ —whether these
latter be the chromosome theory, the factorial ‘hypothesis’, the theory ofcrossing over, or any other — are often the very ones most guilty of
stating their results in terms that make illegitimate implicit assump-
tions, which they themselves are scarcely aware of simply because they
are opposed to dragging ‘speculation’ into the open. Thus they may be
ﬁnally led into theworst blunders of all.” (Muller, 1922, see also Schultz,
1935).
Asked about possible reasons for Goldschmidt's “cold reception” in
the United States, geneticist James Angus Jenkins considered “the
vagueness of ideas” to have been in the main responsible. Jenkins
himself found Goldschmidt's ideas “not so revolutionary but vague
and to use a very trite expression, he appeared to throw the baby out
with the bath” (Jenkins to C. Stern, n.d., ca. 1958, Goldschmidt papers,
Bancroft library, UC Berkeley).
SewallWright, geneticist and one of themain architects of the neo-
Darwinian synthesis of evolutionary biology in the 1930s, shared with
Goldschmidt the conviction of the necessity of physiological genetic
research (Provine, 1986). But he rejected Goldschmidt's claim of
chromosomal rearrangements as mechanisms for saltatory evolution,
because Goldschmidt did not provide any concrete data and because it
contradicted already conﬁrmed theories: “No data are given that
support the conception of a spatial pattern of the germ plasm,
correlatedwith the reaction system of the organism.” (Wright, 1941a)
According to Wright, Goldschmidt's attempt to base his notion on the
position effects of genes contradicted the known facts of “the
independence of the chromosome and the apparent absence of any
correlation between location of genes and at least the more
conspicuous effects of their mutations.” (Ibid.) In other words,
position effects accounted only for occasional second order effects.
Howard D. Lipshitz pointed to a crucial methodological vagueness
in Goldschmidt's work on homoeotic mutants, through which he
(Goldschmidt) attempted to support his concept of saltatory
evolution. Goldschmidt decided to study homoeotic transformations
of the podoptera type in Drosophila, which had a very low
penetrance (frequency with which a heritable trait is manifested by
individuals carrying the principal gene or genes) and were multigenic
in contrast to those of the bithorax type, which had a close to 100%
penetrance. The bithorax mutant in Drosophila was discovered by
Bridges and in the 1940s used by Edward Lewis to link genetic
analysis and development. According to Lipshitz, Goldschmidt's “focus
on multigenic mutant characters with low penetrance meant that
analytical studies were close to impossible” (Lipshitz, 1996). By
contrast, Lewis' success in using the bithorax mutation as a basis for
linking genetics, development and evolution was a result of its being
experimentally tractable (unlike podoptera) and of Lewis (in contrast
to Goldschmidt's) reductionist approach: major advances in scientiﬁc
understanding, Lipshitz argued, “do not come from compendia of
poorly understood phenomena or from erudite-sounding specula-
tions; they come from mechanistic hypotheses and their empirical
tests” (ibid.).
Scott Gilbert, John Opitz, and Rudolf Raff hold a different opinion.
They consider it of the greatest importance that Goldschmidt used
homoeotic mutants in order to criticize the neo-Darwinian claim of
gradual evolution. According to them, Goldschmidt's methodological
vagueness served his aims better than clear-cut research e.g. in
bithorax mutants. They assume that Goldschmidt in trying to
formulate a physiological genetics preferred a gene locus with graded
phenotypes and that this aim also explained his usage of Lymantria
with its unclear sexual types and ecotypes rather than cleaner, more
easily interpreted systems (Gilbert et al., 1996). These authors
describe what they think were Goldschmidt's motivations but they
avoid the question as to whether he was able to provide clear and
reproducible evidence with his approach. As the next section shows,
this was not the case with his Lymantria work.
Lack of reliability of Goldschmidt's research. The reliability of
Goldschmidt's experimental genetic work was drawn into question
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by Goldschmidt made a control of the experiments problematical.
Among the biologists who, using different species, were unable to
conﬁrm central elements of Goldschmidt's Physiological Theory, such
as his quantitative explanation of sex determination and the “time
law”, were Friedrich Baltzer and Goldschmidt's student Jacob Seiler.
With the aim of conﬁrming Goldschmidt's Physiological Theory,
Seiler analyzed the phenomenon of intersexuality in the moth
Solenobia for 25 years. Yet he came to the conclusion: “as far as our
object is concerned, the time law does not apply!” (Seiler, 1949)
Seiler's conclusionwas soon generally accepted, except by Goldschmidt
(Goldschmidt, 1949).
Seiler related Goldschmidt's inability to accept criticism to his
scientiﬁc practice in general: “In the argument with me Goldschmidt,
as he did so often proceeded from the idea and perceived in the
specimen what he wanted to see and overlooked what he did not
want to see. Onemay think of the anecdote: ‘Herr Geheimrat, the facts
are not in accordance with your theory!’ ‘The worse for the facts’”
(Seiler to C. Stern, 19 October 1963, Goldschmidt papers, Bancroft
library, call no. 72/241). Seiler's results were soon generally accepted
also by previous supporters of Goldschmidt's Physiological Theory in
Germany, e.g. by Max Hartmann, Goldschmidt's colleague at the KWI
for Biology in Berlin who in the 1950s distanced himself from
Goldschmidt (Hartmann, 1956). Cytogeneticist Hans Bauer at the
same institute spoke of “Goldschmidt's fehlgeleiteter Lymantria-
Entwicklungs-Physiologie” (Bauer to Hartmann, 8 July 1955, Archive
of theMPG, III. Abt. Nr. 26B), and Hans Friedrich-Freksa, director of the
MPI for Virus Research, accepted that Seiler had demonstrated that
Goldschmidt's “geistvolle Drehpunktstheorie […] does not hold true”
(Friedrich-Freksa, 1961).
Only decades later did several groups of scientists repeat the
crossings with the Lymantria races used by Goldschmidt. They
demonstrated that Goldschmidt's results could not be reproduced
and that his generalizations were untenable. In 1973 Seiler's results
were conﬁrmed for Lymantria (Mosbacher, 1973). Themost extensive
studies were carried out by Cyril Clarke and E. B. Ford in Cambridge
(Clarke and Ford, 1980, 1982, 1983). Repeating those of Goldschmidt's
racial crosses that he regarded as of a particularly fundamental kind,
they found that their results “in the main differ markedly from
[Goldschmidt's ﬁndings]” (Clarke and Ford, 1980). In particular they
found a gross deﬁciency of intersexes in all crosses where intersexes
were expected to occur on Goldschmidt's hypothesis (ibid). Clarke
and Ford conﬁrmed the great excess of males in a crucial cross but
showed that they were not, as Goldschmidt had claimed, transformed
females, but chromosomally males, and in other cases found sex ratios
which differed from Goldschmidt's (Clarke and Ford, 1983). They
interpreted the excess of males as a result of selection — female
embryos or larvae, which in Lymantria are heterozygous, died due to
genic imbalance between the races (Haldane's rule) — and not of the
transformation of sexes. Haldane's rule of 1922 was known to
Goldschmidt, but he did not use it in his interpretations or cite it, a
fact that was criticized also by Julian Huxley (1923).
These studies support the conclusion that Goldschmidt's experi-
mentationwas questionable, and that, despite his claim to the opposite,
his major genetic theories had no experimental basis. The discovery of
intersexes and the subsequent development of the Physiological Theory
of hereditywould have beenGoldschmidt'smost original contributions,
since all his other theories were speculative generalizations of
discoveries and theories by others such as the relationship between
genes and enzymes (see Jacques Loeb's reductionist project of unifying
by physico-chemical explanations), the position effect (discovered by
Sturtevant in 1925), and homoeotic mutants (found by Bateson in 1894
and rediscovered in their importance for evolution by Bridges in 1915).
Thuswith experiments not reproducible and generalizations untenable,
Goldschmidt's potentially most original work did not stand the test of
scrutiny and ﬁnally disappeared.Putting forward theories that were mutually exclusive. In essential
questions Goldschmidt not only changed his views but even discarded
his previous views altogether. He began his evolutionary studies as a
convinced neo-Darwinist. Then he changed his mind and rejected the
neo-Darwinian concept of small changes completely. “I can see no
justiﬁcation for your too exclusive alternatives: either neo-Darwinism
or no neo-Darwinism”, was the comment of geneticist Ernest Brown
Babcock in 1941 (E.B. Babcock 23 April 1941 to Goldschmidt,
Goldschmidt papers, Bancroft library, UC Berkeley).
Goldschmidt rejected the Mendelian concept of genes as put
forward by Morgan and his school by proposing a physiological
concept of genes, based on the idea that they were enzymes. Later he
changed this view by discarding the concept of discrete genes
altogether, putting forward his concept of chromosomes as a whole.
However, contrary to this notion, he used the gene concept again
when he based his claim of saltatory evolution on homoeotic genes. In
none of these cases did he critically re-evaluate the evidence onwhich
he had based his previous views.
My assessment of Goldschmidt's work on genetics, development
and evolution
(i) Contrary to the opinion of some of Goldschmidt's colleagues
and of historians, Goldschmidt, as shown above, did not
integrate genetics, development and evolution in any mean-
ingful way. Curt Stern (1969) suggested that if “Darwin had his
protecting bulldog, Huxley, and his prophet, Haeckel, Gold-
schmidt was his own bulldog and prophet.” This may explain in
part why hewas considered a prominent ﬁgure in physiological
genetics, but it unjustly pushed into the background those
many researchers who at an early stage, unlike Goldschmidt,
contributed to a real understanding of the biochemical
developmental action of genes, a long process, culminating in
the one gene-one enzyme hypothesis. Among these research-
ers were Garrod, 1902; Cuénot, 1903; Bateson, 1909; Loeb and
Chamberlain, 1915; Wright, 1916; Caspari, 1933; Butenandt
et al., 1940; Kühn, 1941; Beadle and Ephrussi, 1936 and 1937;
Beadle and Tatum, 1941; Horowitz and Leupold, 1951; see also
the overviews in Ravin, 1977; Burian et al., 1991; Kohler, 1991;
Rheinberger, 2000.
(ii) The most fundamental criticism of his work relates to the purely
speculative nature of his allegedly quantitative experimental
work on the one hand, and the non-reproducibility of core
experiments on the other.
(iii) His anti-reductionist approach to developmental genetics – the
germ plasm as a whole controls “a deﬁnite reaction system,
which then is not a mosaic of separate effects but a single
developmental system controlled as a whole by one agency” –
was too vague in order to serve as a basis for further research.
Progress in developmental genetics as well as in systems biology
was not achieved by giving up the notion of underlying discrete
genetic elements, even though recent developments have
rendered the concept of the gene (or rather genes) very complex.
An example is Eric Davidson, discoverer of developmental gene-
regulatory networks and their crucial role in evolutionary
mechanisms, who considers it important that “now there are
literally scores of genes forwhich detailed experimental analyses
have demonstrated sharply modular cis-regulatory elements,
such that given, nonoverlapping regions of the genomic DNA
each control a speciﬁc subcomponent of the overall expression
pattern” (Davidson, 2006). Even though scientists like Gould
related toGoldschmidtbecause of their commoncriticismof neo-
Darwinian gradualism as the only evolutionary mechanism,
there is no evidence that Goldschmidt stimulated the work of
present-day evolutionary developmental biologists to this effect.
(iv) Speculative theories, which claim to be experimentally proved,
can be harmful. Certainly, Goldschmidt was inﬂuential, if only
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necessarily turn out to be beneﬁcial. The case of Jacob Seiler
who unsuccessfully spent many years of his active research life
attempting to conﬁrm Goldschmidt, is a case in point.
According to Marsha Richmond (2007) British biologists were
strongly inﬂuenced by Goldschmidt. Thus Conrad Waddington
in his 1939 textbook on genetics frequently and approvingly
cited Goldschmidt's questionable Lymantria work on sex
factors and genes as enzymes (ibid.), which shows that
inﬂuences can be detrimental. Later on Waddington became
critical of Goldschmidt's work and J. B. S. Haldane seemed to
have been quite unaffected by Goldschmidt's revolutionary
claim that the classical gene no longer existed: “I am not so
alarmed as I should be by your letter in Nature. After all the
gene is not an indivisible atom, but a region of the chromosome
generally behaving as a unit. We have to treat genes as
indivisible for some purposes, but I don't take this indivisibility
too seriously. However perhaps this is because I am a dialectical
materialist.” (Haldane, Nov. 24 n.d., between 1938 and 1940, to
Goldschmidt, Goldschmidt papers, Bancroft library, UCBerkeley).
(v) Goldschmidt tried late in his life to present himself as the
originator of a dynamic philosophy of genetics: “Two
philosophies of genetics … One is the statistical, or static,
point of view, the other the physiological, or dynamic point of
view” (Goldschmidt, 1954). This appears as an attempt to
downplay the criticism he received, in particular from the
Morgan school. Goldschmidt's view has been taken up again
recently by historians of science: “ultimately, the conﬂict
between Goldschmidt and the Morgan school can be
regarded as a kind of struggle for authority between two
competing theories, methods, and programs for genetics. …
[Morgan's] transmission genetics [and Goldschmidt's] vision
of a physiological or developmental genetics.” (Richmond
and Dietrich, 2002) In contrast, I conclude that it was not
Goldschmidt's philosophy, but his fundamental methodolog-
ical ﬂaws, which made his work unacceptable to the Morgan
school and other geneticists.
(vi) I assume that the positive assessments of Stern and Caspari,
whose own research practices differed markedly from those of
Goldschmidt, were also motivated by a feeling of solidarity, all
three of them being refugees from Nazi Germany. Curt Stern
depicted Goldschmidt as inﬂuenced by Goethe and displaying an
attitude of genius, which in early 20th century was not unusual
among scientists: “Goldschmidt's inﬂuence on the biology of the
twentieth century rested on observation and experiment as well
as on the theory-building sweep of his imagination. … He had
early trained himself to be a revolutionary of science. … He
molded his life after Goethe. … He knew his worth. … [He]
formed his existence into a piece of art” (Stern, 1958; see
comments in Charpa andDeichmann, 2007). This attitude of self-
aggrandizement here led scientiﬁcally into a dead end because it
was accompanied by the violation of basic scientiﬁc standards
and a complete lack of self-criticism.
Sewall Wright's combination of reductionist research and vision
of hierarchical genetic systems
Finally, I brieﬂy contrast Goldschmidt's attempts to integrate
development, genetics, physiology, and evolution to those of Sewall
Wright, who, born in 1889 in Melrose, USA, was 10 years younger
than Goldschmidt.Wright studied zoology andmathematics before he
became a genetics student of William Castle at the Bussey Institution
at Harvard University, where he received his Ph.D. in 1915. After
working at the Animal Husbandry Division of the United States
Department of Agriculture, he became professor of zoology at the
University of Chicago in 1926, and from 1955 until 1960 wasprofessor, afterwards emeritus professor, of genetics at the University
ofWisconsin in Madison. Wright is best known for his work on animal
breeding, mathematical population genetics, and evolutionary theory:
he became one of the three major architects of the neo-Darwinian
Synthesis between Mendelian genetics and Darwinism (the two
others were Ronald A. Fisher and J.B.S. Haldane). His “shifting balance
theory” of evolution, according to which evolutionary change is best
achieved by a large population which is comprised of many small,
partially isolated local groups, has been very popular and inﬂuential
among biologists (Crow, 1994). Here I do not comment on his
evolutionary theory (for details see e.g. Provine, 1971, 2001, 1986).
Wright was, unlike Fisher and Haldane, also a pioneer in
physiological and developmental genetics, in particular of small
mammals. He worked on pigment genetics mainly of guinea pigs from
his time as a graduate student until his retirement from the University
of Chicago in 1955 (see e.g. Wright's extensive review (Wright,
1941b)). His approach was methodically broad. In his papers on color
inheritance he used the latest knowledge of pigment chemistry and
enzyme kinetics in order to interpret color interactions (Crow, 1994).
From the beginning of his genetic work he was more concerned with
interaction effects of genes than were Fisher and Haldane (Provine,
[1971], 2001). He examined howmultiple genes interacted to produce
speciﬁc phenotypes and, referring to works of Morgan and Bridges on
the interaction of genes affecting eye color in Drosophila, showed that
the combined effect of the alleles at two different loci could be either
equal to the sum of the alleles' individual effects (additive model) or
non-additive (stronger or weaker); (a review of these papers is in
Wright, 1941b). Examining the genetics of coat color in guinea pigs,
he found four factors, which were closely linked and had a
quantitative effect on the production of dark pigment. He interpreted
them as “variations of the same thing”, as variations in a “factor which
determines the power of tyrosinase” (Wright, 1916, cited in Ravin,
1977), a statement which implies the notion that genes and also
multiple alleles act by determining speciﬁc enzymes. Unlike Gold-
schmidt, Wright differentiated between the power to determine an
enzyme from the enzyme itself. Using a complex model with
interacting genes, Wright was able to predict quantitatively the
pigment measures of genotypes involving alleles at six loci, a major
achievement in physiological genetics (Crow, 1987).
His major analyses of the physiology of the gene, i.e. genic action,
in development were published in 1941, the same year as George
Beadle's and Edward Tatum's study on biochemical mutants in
Neurospora. This latter work, which some time later gave rise to the
one gene-one enzyme theory (Horowitz and Leupold, 1951), initiated
what was later called molecular genetics in microorganisms.
Biochemical genetics in Neurospora, and shortly after bacteria, with
their large number of mutations and traceable biochemical pathways,
wasmore efﬁcient thanWright's. Therefore, thoughWright continued
his guinea pig studies for another ﬁfteen years, and though they were
conducted at high standards, “masterful studies in extracting
maximum information from difﬁcult material” (Crow, 1994), these
studies received little attention.
Wright's experimental developmental genetics, in particular his
emphasis on gene interactions, inﬂuenced strongly his work on
evolutionary theory, as was observed by Richard Lewontin (1980):
“Wright — unlike Fisher, based his evolutionary synthesis on the
importance of gene interactions. Wright always identiﬁed himself
primarily as a developmental geneticist. He said to me once that the
mathematical work was really a diversion from his ﬁrst love, which
was guinea pigs. Wright's papers provide immensely complicated
diagrams of the interactions of all the coat color genes in guinea pigs.
He introduced his new four-volume work on evolution (1968–1978)
with this kind of developmental genetic manipulation.”
Wright held that evolutionary creativity often depended on putting
together favorable combinations of genes that were individually
deleterious. As he pointed out in his shifting balance theory, small
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harmonious gene combination. This conception was received well by
many biologists but rejected by others, in particular by Fisher (Crow,
1994).
Generally Wright was more than most of his contemporary
geneticists open not only to mathematical modeling and the notion
of gene interactions, but also to chemical explanations, for example of
these interactions. He strongly rejected Ernst Mayr's view that all
population geneticists used “beanbag genetics”, which disregarded
gene interactions and natural populations (Wright, 1960). According
to Wright, abstract mathematical theory, which alone cannot analyze
and predict events in natural populations, should be reciprocally
related to the concrete facts of experimentation. The role of theory, he
held, was that of an intermediary between “the bodies of factual
knowledge discovered at two levels, that of the individual and that of
the population” (ibid.).
Wright conﬁned his evolutionary work to populations; he
deliberately left aside questions of the generation of new species or
higher taxa. He accepted Gould's and Eldredge's (1977) criticism of
phyletic gradualism, which according to him had much in common
with Simpson's (1944) view, based on palaeontological data, of the
different rates of evolution (Wright, 1982). Wright agreed with
Simpson's rejection of Goldschmidt's thesis (1940) that speciation
and the origins of higher categories depend on types of mutations
that have nothing in common with the changes that occur within
species. Opposed to grand speculations, he held that though genetics
at the time bore directly only on evolution in populations,
phenomena at the higher level should be explained as far as possible,
“as ﬂowing from observed phenomena of genetics in the broad sense,
including cytogenetics, before postulating wholly unknown process-
es” (ibid.). Unlike Goldschmidt he did not use his developmental
genetic experiments for the proposition of newmechanisms for large
evolutionary changes. But by rejecting Goldschmidt's intuitive and
superﬁcial argumentation of the spatial re-organization of chromo-
somes as requirement for speciation and Goldschmidt's claim that
the germ plasmas awhole controls “a deﬁnite reaction system,which
then is not a mosaic of separate effects but a single developmental
system controlled as a whole by one agency” (Goldschmidt, 1940),
Wright developed a far-sighted model of hierarchical integrated
genetic systems in the body with evolutionary implications (1941a):
“[Goldschmidt] seems to hold that the conception of the organismas
an integrated reaction system requires a corresponding spatial
integration of the germ plasm and that essential change in the reaction
system can thus come about only by repatterning of the chromosomes.
To others, a temporal integration is all that is necessary, or even possible,
with the chain reaction as the simpliﬁedmodel.Within the organism as
a more or less integrated reaction system, there is a hierarchy of
subordinate reaction systems, eachwith considerable independence, as
shown by capacities for self-differentiation. Thus theremust be partially
isolated reaction systems for each kind of organ and for each kind of cell.
It is difﬁcult to see how any spatial pattern in the germ plasm can
operate in determining these, but there is no theoretic difﬁculty with a
branching hierarchic system of chain reactions in which genes are
brought into effective action whenever presented with the proper
substrates, irrespective of their locations in the cells. There is no limit to
the number of reaction systems that can be based on the same set of
genes, and such systems may obviously evolve more or less indepen-
dently of each other.”
As a possible mechanism for generating organisms with an
alternation of generations in evolution (such as coelenterates which
alternate between medusae and polyps), he suggested a gradual
suppression of one reaction system (e.g. of the ﬁxed phase) and
elaboration of that of the free phase.
To conclude, Wright opened up new paths of testable quantitative
investigations in his developmental-genetic studies as well as
evolution. His developmental genetics and his new evolutionarytheory, the shifting balance theory, did not contradict experimentally
and theoretically well supported genetic theories though the shifting
balance theory caused strong controversy with Fisher whose “theory
of dominance” it called into question (see e.g. Wright, 1929). Wright's
view that properties of biological systems are the results “of chemical
combinations, of gene combination, course of ontogeny etc.”, and that
the examination of these systems should be based on clearly deﬁned
properties of the components in order to be scientiﬁc (Wright, 1935)
has proved superior to holistic approaches to biological systems such
as Goldschmidt's. Wright placed his research in a framework of logical
reasoning which resulted in the farsighted speculation that a systems
approach should be related to the regulation of hierarchical genetic
subsystems which might provide a possible mechanism for develop-
ment and evolution. His seminal work on developmental genetics
and his reﬂections on biological systems contributed to progress in
these ﬁelds. In addition I argue that Wright's decision not to propose
theories about those mechanisms on the basis of existing experi-
mental data, ﬁnds its rationale in the fact that the scientiﬁc tools
for their elucidation were not yet available (Morange, 2010, see also
Falk, 2009).
Outlook
Loeb's reductionist research project uniﬁed approaches of physiol-
ogy, genetics and embryology with the aim of ﬁnding physico-chemical
(molecular) explanations for all life processes including evolution. This
projectwas later continued inmolecular biology, a synthesis of physico-
chemical and biologicalﬁelds. Though themolecular approach has been
highly successful and indispensible for higher level investigations, up to
the present day properties of biological systems cannot be fully
explained on the molecular level alone.
Goldschmidt's anti-reductionist approach to development and
evolution, in which he treated biological systems as a whole and not
composed of separate integrated components, was methodically
ﬂawed; his crucial experiments either non-reproducible or too
vague to serve as a basis for further research. His widely propagated
attempt to integrate physiology, genetics, development and evolution
turned out to be a dead end.
Sewall Wright combined a reductionist approach in which he
considered the analysis of genes and genic action in development
crucially important – conducting experiments to this end – for any
higher level investigations with farsighted speculation on relating
properties of biological systems to the regulation of hierarchical
genetic subsystems. His suggestion to base the study of biological
systems on clearly deﬁned properties of the components has proved
superior to holistic approaches which start examinations from
systems as a whole.
Generally, progress in biology has been achieved by replacing
inefﬁcient or incorrect concepts and methods by better ones, by
opening up new lines of research, and by integrating formerly
disparate ﬁelds of research. According to Michel Morange (2010),
steps to a meaningful integration of developmental-genetic mech-
anisms and evolution started mainly in the 1970s and 1980s, when
the isolation of developmental genes and the characterization of
gene-regulatory-networks became technically possible. The devel-
opment of modern biology in the 19th century began by separating,
at least methodically, formerly integrated lines of research. Later on
several of these different ﬁelds were united again by integration. A
pre-requisite for these successful integrations was sufﬁcient knowl-
edge of the parts. Attempts to integrate them at a too early stage
proved futile.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at
doi:10.1016/j.ydbio.2011.02.020.
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